GOVT 407 Quizzes
GOVT 407 Quiz Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Covers the Learn material from Module 2: Week 2.
- Carella (New York) collides with McGee (Florida) during a car chase in New York City. Carella is disabled in the accident, retires to Florida, and sues McGee in a federal district court in Florida. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case based on diversity?
- Carella (New York) sues Underworld, Inc., incorporated in Delaware, doing business in every state, with its principal place of business in Florida. Suit is brought in the federal district court for the Northern District of Florida. Does the court have jurisdiction?
- Colbert, a New Yorker, sues Kojak for a violation of her federal civil rights. Suit is brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the federal statute that authorizes suit for such violations. The claim arises out of an unlawful arrest that took place in New York. Kojak is also domiciled in New York. May she bring the suit in a California federal court?
- Costa is injured in an accident with Prior on Interstate 95. Prior is a trucker who is engaged in interstate commerce, transporting goods among the various states on the eastern seaboard. Costa claims that Prior was negligent, in that he fell asleep and swerved into her lane, causing the accident. Does the claim come within the arising- under jurisdiction authorized by 28 U.S.C. §1331?
- Hamilton from Pennsylvania sues Franklin from Pennsylvania in a federal district court in New York. Is there diversity between the parties?
- Hammer sues Holmes for for $70,000 for his personal injuries suffered in an auto accident and for $15,000 for damage to his car in the same accident. Is the amount-in- controversy requirement met in this case?
- Hammer sues Holmes for $60,000 for damages suffered in an accident. In the same action, Marlowe, who was a passenger in Hammer’s car, sues Holmes for $25,000 for his injuries. Is the amount-in-controversy requirement met in this case?
- Hammer sues Holmes for $80,000 for his injuries in the accident. In the same suit, Marlowe, the passenger in Hammer’s car, sues for $25,000. Is the amount-in- controversy requirement met in this case?
- Hammer sues Holmes for $80,000 for injuries suffered in an auto accident. He also sues Dr. Watson, claiming that Watson negligently treated his injuries, causing $20,000 in additional damages. Is the amount-in-controversy requirement met in the claim against Watson?
- Hammer sues Holmes to recover $60,000 on a loan he made to Holmes and for $50,000 for an unrelated libel. Is the amount-in-controversy requirement met in this case?
- Landry wishes to sue Deveaux for violation of the New Mexico Consumer Protection Act. Does her case arise under the “laws of the United States”?
- Mark (a Virginia citizen) files a lawsuit against John (a Virginia citizen) for breach of contract. Mark anticipates that John will raise a federal defense to his suit, so he files the case in federal district court. Is the case properly brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. §1331?
- Marlowe (California) sues Archer (California) in federal court in California for damages under a federal firearms control statute. May the court hear the case?
- Marlowe (California) sues Gamblers International, Inc., a corporation incorporated in Nevada. Gamblers has two casinos: one very large casino in Reno, Nevada, which grosses $100 million per year, and another casino in California, which does $70 million in business each year. The corporate offices are in California. Is there diversity jurisdiction in Marlowe’s suit?
- Marshall is arrested by Brennan, a police officer. Marshall alleges that Brennan used excessive force in making the arrest, causing serious injury to Marshall. Marshall decides to sue in federal court and to assert only a state law battery claim. Is the case properly brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. §1331?
- McGee (Florida) sues Underworld, Inc., incorporated in Delaware, doing business in every state, with its principal place of business in Florida. Suit is brought in the federal district court for the Southern District New York. Is there diversity jurisdiction?
- McGee’s $100,000 houseboat is destroyed in a collision with boats piloted by Spenser and Carella. He claims that either Spenser, Carella, or both, were negligent and sues them both to recover for the damage to the boat. Is the amount-in-controversy requirement met in this case?
- McGee sues Spenser for causing $50,000 worth of damage to McGee’s houseboat. His complaint contains two counts. Count One seeks $50,000 from Spenser for negligently ramming the boat while docking in Fort Lauderdale. Count Two seeks $50,000 from Spenser on the theory that he intentionally damaged the boat. Is the amount-in- controversy requirement met in this case?
- McGee sues Spenser for $60,000 for intentionally damaging his boat and for $50,000 in punitive damages. Is the amount-in-controversy requirement met in this case?
- Meyer, a New Yorker, decides to move to Arizona. He buys an Audi from Isola Volkswagen, a New York dealership incorporated in New York, and sets off with his family for Arizona. While driving through Oklahoma, he is involved in an accident and hospitalized. Two months later, while still in the hospital, Meyer files a negligence suit against Isola in an Oklahoma federal court. Does the court have diversity jurisdiction?
- Smith from South Carolina sues both Baldwin from South Carolina and Britt from North Carolina in a federal district court. Is there diversity between the parties?
- Steinberg, the public relations manager for Pinnacle Engineering Company, is fired. He concludes that he was fired simply because the company wanted a younger person in his job and brings suit against Pinnacle under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a federal statute that bars discharge or other discrimination in employment based on age. The statute expressly creates a right for employees to sue for damages for acts of age discrimination. Pinnacle admits that the ADEA governs its employees, and that Steinberg, who is 57, is protected under the statute. It defends on the ground that it fired him for incompetence, not based on his age. Is the case properly brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. §1331?
- Stewart, a California citizen, wishes to sue Cagney, also a Californian, for battery, to recover for injuries he suffered in a fight between them on a Los Angeles street. Stewart prefers to sue Cagney in California. (Assume that his damages exceed $75,000.) Would a state court in California have subject matter jurisdiction over Cagney?
- Suppose that federal courts did not use the Mottley rule; instead, they upheld jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 if either the plaintiff’s complaint or the defendant’s answer raised an issue of federal law. The Mottleys bring suit in federal court, demanding specific performance of their contract. You represent the railroad, which is considering raising several defenses to the Mottleys’ claim, some based in federal law and some in state law. If you wanted to avoid federal court, what would you advise the railroad to do in answering the complaint?
- Suppose that Steinberg is from Florida and sues both Pinnacle (a Florida corporation) and Swift, president of Pinnacle and a Florida citizen. His suit alleges that he was fired because of his age and demands damages under the ADEA. Can he bring the action in federal court?
- Wilson from New Jersey sues Madison from Virginia in a federal district court. Is there diversity between the parties?
- Wilson sues Morris for spilling mustard on his favorite T-shirt. Wilson sues in federal court seeking $80,000 in compensatory damages. Is the amount-in-controversy requirement met in this case?
- Stewart, a California citizen, wishes to sue Cagney, also a Californian, for battery, to recover for injuries he suffered in a fight between them on a Los Angeles street. Stewart prefers to sue Cagney in California. (Assume that his damages exceed $75,000.) Would a federal court in California have personal jurisdiction over Cagney?
- Stewart, a California citizen, wishes to sue Cagney, also a Californian, for battery, to recover for injuries he suffered in a fight between them on a Los Angeles street. Stewart prefers to sue Cagney in California. (Assume that his damages exceed $75,000.) Would a federal court in California have subject matter jurisdiction over the action?
- Stewart, a California citizen, wishes to sue Cagney, also a Californian, for battery, to recover for injuries he suffered in a fight between them on a Los Angeles street. Stewart prefers to sue Cagney in California. (Assume that his damages exceed $75,000.) Would a state court in California have personal jurisdiction over Cagney?
GOVT 407 Quiz Joinder
Covers the Learn material from Module 4: Week 4.
- Morisot and Cassatt hire Van Gogh and Renoir to paint their studio. Van Gogh and Renoir hire Pissarro as an assistant. Pissarro goes for coffee, leaving the electric paint remover on, and burns the studio to the ground. Morisot breaks her leg jumping from the third-story window, three of Cassatt’s priceless masterpieces are burned, and Renoir suffers second-degree burns. Everyone is mad. Suppose that Morisot and Cassatt are co-owners of the studio. May they join as plaintiffs to sue Pissarro for the damages to the studio from the re?
- Suppose that Cassatt owns the studio on her own. May she and Morisot join as plaintiffs to sue Pissarro for his negligence, if Cassatt seeks recovery for damage to the building and Morisot seeks damages for her broken leg?
- Assume that Van Gogh and Renoir are liable for the negligence of Pissarro under the law of respondeat superior, if he acted in the scope of his employment in leaving the heat gun on. May Morisot sue Van Gogh, Renoir, and Pissarro in a single action to recover for her broken leg?
- Could Cassatt sue Van Gogh and Renoir for breach of contract for burning down her studio in the process of painting it, and Morisot join as a coplaintiff asserting a negligence claim against the same defendants for the injury to her leg?
- Change the facts a little: Assume that either Pissarro or Gauguin, another employee, left the paint remover on, and Cassatt is unsure which it was. Can she sue them both under Rule 20(a)(2)?
- If Cassatt chooses to sue Renoir alone, may she assert both negligence and breach of contract claims against Renoir for her losses in the re?
- If Cassatt sues Renoir and Van Gogh for breach of contract, do the rules authorize her to add a claim against Renoir for breach of a separate contract to paint her house in another village?
- Cassatt sues Renoir for breach of the studio painting contract. Later, after losing on that claim, she sues Renoir for a previous breach of the unrelated contract to paint her house. Can she do that?
- Assume that Morisot owned the studio and contracted with Renoir and Van Gogh to paint it. Morisot sues Renoir and Pissarro for negligence and breach of contract as a result of the studio re. Renoir asserts a claim against Morisot in the same action for payment for the painting work that had been completed before the building burned. Is Renoir’s claim properly joined?
- What would happen if Renoir did not assert this claim in Morisot’s suit, but sued on it separately in a later action?
- Following up on the last example, assume that Renoir also has a claim against Morisot for injuries suffered in an auto accident two months after the re but before the suit was commenced. Can he assert this claim as well?
- Suppose on the same facts that the only counterclaim Renoir had against Morisot was for the unrelated auto accident. Could he assert it in this action?
- If Morisot sues Renoir for her re losses, may Renoir assert his claim against Morisot for breach of the studio painting contract and also bring in Cassatt (a co-signer of the contract) as a codefendant on that claim?
- Browning, Blake, and Wordsworth are involved in a three-car collision. Browning, a New Yorker, sues Blake and Wordsworth, both from Ohio, for $80,000 for her personal injuries. Blake asserts a crossclaim against Wordsworth for his own injuries arising from the collision. Does the court have jurisdiction over the crossclaim?
- In an important armative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999), reversed in part on other grounds by Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), white students rejected by the University of Michigan brought suit challenging the University’s armative action policies, which allowed consideration of race as a factor in admissions to the University. Such policies are often defended on the ground that they provide a remedy for past discrimination based on race and that they assist in achieving a diverse student body that provides a vital learning environment. Minority students who planned to apply to the University moved to intervene as defendants in the action to argue in support of those policies. Would the intervening students satisfy the standard for intervention in Rule 24(a)(2)?
- Keats, from Minnesota, is arrested by Shelley, a Minnesota police ocer, for disturbing the peace. During the arrest, Shelley forcibly restrains Keats, and Keats resists. Keats claims that Shelley used excessive force in making the arrest and sues Shelley in federal court under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983. Keats also seeks to recover from Shelley on a state law claim for battery based on the scue that took place during the arrest. Does the court have constitutional power to hear the battery claim?
- Does the court have statutory authority to hear the battery claim?
- Assume that the court declined in its discretion to hear Keats’s battery claim. What would happen to the §1983 claim?
- Assume that the court concluded that it lacked power to hear the battery claim. What should it do with the §1983 claim?
- Apparently there was some prior history to the Keats/Shelley altercation; Shelley owed Keats $500 at the time of arrest as payment for work that Keats had done on his house. Keats was upset because he had not been paid and tempers ared, leading to the arrest. Keats therefore asserts a third claim for the debt in his action against Shelley. Does the court have the power to hear it?
- Maroney brings a tort action against Massoud for serious injuries suffered in an accident. Paramount Insurance Company, Maroney’s health insurer, moves to intervene as a co-plaintiff, to recover $175,000 it paid for Maroney’s medical treatment as a result of the accident. Under its health insurance contract with Maroney, Paramount has a contractual right to be reimbursed for these payments from any tort judgment Maroney recovers from Massoud. Which element of Rule 24(a) is Paramount most likely to fail?
- Minority reghters bring a race discrimination case against the Town of Rangeley in federal court. They claim that the Town has historically discriminated against minorities in the promotion of reghters and seek an injunction requiring that forty percent of all future promotions go to minority reghters until the percentage of minority lieutenants in the department reects the percentage of minorities in the town. The Town moves to join the non-minority reghters in the department as defendants in the case. Are they parties to be joined if feasible under Rule 19(a)?
- Paredes, a New York City landlord, sues the New York City Housing Department, claiming unreasonable delays in processing applications for refunds of excess housing tax payments. He seeks an order from the court mandating prompt processing of his applications. The Department claims that state law bars it from granting refunds until it completes an audit of the landlord’s rent history, which it cannot do until it receives relevant documents from the State Housing Division. Is the State Housing Division is a person to be joined if feasible?
- Ramirez, from Colorado, sues Bryan, from Montana, for injuries in a three-car auto collision. The suit is for negligence and is brought in a court that applies joint and several liability in tort cases — that is, each party who is found to have negligently caused the plaintiff’s injury is liable to her for her full damages. Bryan moves to dismiss the case for failure to join Grayson, a citizen of Colorado. He argues that Ramirez should have joined Grayson as a co- defendant, because Grayson drove a third car involved in the accident and may have also been negligent. Is Grayson a person to be joined if feasible under Rule 19(a)(1)(A)?
- Schutten, a Louisiana citizen, sues Shell Oil Company in federal court. Schutten claims that he owns certain land from which Shell is pumping oil and is entitled to royalties on the oil. Shell (a citizen of states other than Louisiana) claims that it does not owe any royalties to Schutten, since it acquired the mineral rights on the land from the Orleans Levee Board, the true owner of the land, which is entitled to the royalties. Shell moves to join the Orleans Levee Board (a Louisiana public district) in the action under Rule 19(a). Is the Levee Board a person to be joined if feasible under Rule 19(a)?
- Suppose a case brought by a natural gas pipeline company, seeking a license to build a pipeline across the corner of a town. Which of the following interested spectators would have the weakest argument for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) in the case?
- Suppose that Blake (Ohio) asserts a counterclaim against Browning (New York) for $35,000 for his injuries. Does the court have jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim?
- Weninger, a Vermont citizen, suffers from a condition that she believes to be a side effect from taking Sindox, a drug manufactured by Apex Pharmaceuticals. She sues Apex for resulting damages in federal court. Garriega, who took the same drug in Utah a few months later and suffers from the same condition, reads about Weninger’s lawsuit in the papers. Could Garriega intervene as a plaintiff in Weninger’s suit?
- Xavier, a Wisconsin citizen, brings a diversity action against Apex Corporation. Xavier claims that Belinsky, an Apex employee, negligently injured him while driving a truck for Apex, so that Apex is liable for his negligence. Apex is incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in Illinois. It moves to join Belinsky, a Wisconsin citizen, as a party in the action, claiming that Belinsky has an interest in the case because his negligence will be adjudicated. Is Belinsky a person to be joined under Rule 19(a)?
- Yost, from South Carolina, worked for the Torrington Company (incorporated in Virginia with its principal place of business there). When hired, he signed an agreement not to work on any competing projects for another company for two years and not to reveal trade secrets. He subsequently resigned and went to work for INA, a Virginia competitor. Torrington sued Yost for breach of the agreement, seeking an injunction barring him from working for INA. Suppose that INA had moved to intervene. Would the court have permitted the intervention?
GOVT 407 Quiz Discovery
- A notice of deposition must state the time and place of taking the deposition, the and of each person to be examined and the method by which the examination will be recorded.
- Assume that GreenChem’s attorney interviewed a GreenChem employee who was mixing the chemicals that allegedly caused the explosion. GreenChem’s attorney writes down on a notepad his questions and the employee’s answers to these questions. The employee dies a few days later from injuries he sustained in the explosion. Woodson sends a request for production of documents to GreenChem seeking “any notes of discussions with GreenChem employees concerning the events in the lawsuit.” GreenChem objects based on the work product doctrine in Rule 26(b)(3). Should Woodson be able to get a copy of the notes?
- Washington sends interrogatories to Jefferson asking him to state his annual income for the past twenty years. Jefferson believes this information is not relevant to the lawsuit. What can Jefferson’s attorney do?
- During Hamilton’s deposition, Titus asks him, “Did you tell your lawyer you had ten beers before the accident?” Titus’s lawyer objects to the question based on the attorney-client privilege. Does the privilege apply to this question?
- Granny’s attorney wants to conduct a deposition on Speedy to get his testimony on the accident. Speedy’s attorney asks Granny’s attorney to give him the questions ahead of the deposition so Speedy can be prepared. Is this a legitimate request?
- In hopes of finding as much evidence as possible in the lawsuit against the Arlington County Police Department, Jennifer’s lawyer sends the following request for production of documents: “Provide all documents that are in the possession of the police department, its agents, and its employees.” Is this a valid discovery request under Rule 26(b)(1)?
- Jefferson’s attorney schedules an oral deposition of Dr. Washington. During the deposition, Jefferson’s attorney asks Dr. Washington if he has ever been unfaithful to his wife. Should Washington’s attorney allow his client to answer the question?
- Jefferson sends a request for production of documents to Dr. Washington asking him to produce all of his personal journals for inspection. Dr. Washington believes his journals are not relevant to the lawsuit. What can Dr. Washington’s attorney do to prevent the journals from being produced?
- Jefferson sends interrogatories to Dr. Washington. After forty-five days, Dr. Washington has not responded to the interrogatories. What can Jefferson’s attorney do to get Dr. Washington to answer the interrogatories?
- Jefferson sues Dr. Washington for medical malpractice. Dr. Washington receives an interrogatory from Jefferson that asks: “State whether you ingested any drugs or alcohol on the day you performed surgery on Jefferson.” Although Dr. Washington had ingested a narcotic on the day of the surgery, he answers “no” to the interrogatory. Has Dr. Washington violated Rule 33?
- Jennifer wishes to conduct a deposition on Hamilton, who is not a party in her lawsuit against Thompson and the Arlington County Police Department. What must she send to Hamilton in order to compel him to attend the deposition?
- Jennifer wishes to sue Thompson, an Arlington County Police Officer, for injuries she sustained when Thompson arrested her for disorderly conduct. Jennifer also sues the police department alleging that it failed to properly train its officers how to conduct arrests. Jennifer does not know who at the police department conducts training for the officers. What is the most effective way for Jennifer to get the identity of this person from the police department?
- Johnson, a former professional basketball player, sues Dr. Ramsey for damages alleging that the doctor’s negligence in operating on his foot ended his basketball career. Johnson sends interrogatories to Dr. Ramsey’s neighbor asking if he has a drinking problem. May the neighbor refuse to respond to the interrogatories?
- Johnson and Ramsey send each other automatic disclosures as required by Rule 26(a)(1). However, Johnson decides not to disclose the identity of a key witness so that he can surprise Ramsey right before trial. Can Johnson withhold this information under Rule 26(a)(1)?
- Johnson sends interrogatories to Ramsey seeking the identity of everyone who was present during his foot surgery. Ramsey provides the names of two nurses. Months later, he recalls that a third nurse was present during the surgery. What should Ramsey do now?
- Johnson sends interrogatories to Ramsey seeking information regarding the foot surgery. Sixty days later, Ramsey answers the interrogatories. Has Ramsey properly followed Rule 33?
- One of the witnesses states in the deposition that the light was clearly red for Speedy when he entered the intersection. At trial, the same witness states that the light was actually green for Speedy when he entered the intersection and that he was lying during the deposition. Which of the following best characterizes the witness’s lie?
- Peach Computer Company files a lawsuit against MBI, Inc. alleging that MBI violated Peach’s patent on a particular software program. Peach sends a Rule 34 Request for Production of documents requesting every email that has ever been sent or received by an MBI employee. MBI objects to the request on the ground that it is unduly burdensome. Is the objection valid?
- Phillips seeks compensatory damages for the injuries he sustained from the riding lawnmower. Southern sends a Rule 34 request for production of documents to Phillips seeking copies of all medical bills related to the accident. Must Phillips produce them?
- Phillips sends interrogatories to Southern inquiring whether other customers have been injured while using the same Southern riding lawnmower. Do these interrogatories seek relevant information?
- Phillips sends interrogatories to Southern requesting emails from company employees about the design of the lawnmower. Southern objects on the ground that such emails would be inadmissible “hearsay” at trial. Is the objection proper?
- Phillips was injured using a riding lawnmower manufactured by Southern Tractor Company. Phillips sues Southern alleging that it negligently designed the lawnmower. During discovery, he sends a Rule 34 request for production of documents that includes a request for all written documents showing the design of the mower. Southern objects to this request on the ground that it is irrelevant. Is this objection valid?
- Ramsey sends interrogatories to Johnson asking him to state the substance of any discussions he has had with his attorney regarding the possible causes of his foot injury. Johnson objects based on the attorney-client privilege. Is Johnson’s objection valid?
- Simpson files a lawsuit against Stuff Mart claiming that the company has engaged in a pattern of sex discrimination by refusing to promote her and other women in the company due to their sex. Simpson sends interrogatories to Stuff Mart asking how many women in the company have been promoted within the past five years. Do these interrogatories seek relevant information?
- Titus sues Hamilton for injuries sustained in a boating accident. Titus alleges that Hamilton was drunk at the time of accident. Hamilton hires a lawyer and tells him that he had consumed ten beers and was in fact drunk at the time of the accident. Titus sends interrogatories to Hamilton asking how many drinks he had consumed before the accident. Titus’s attorney objects to the interrogatory based on the attorney-client privilege. Is the objection valid?
- True or False. A notice of deposition must be served on all parties to the action?
- When Phillips files suit, Southern raises the defense in its answer that Phillips’ failure to properly maintain the lawnmower led to his injuries. Southern sends interrogatories to Phillips inquiring about how often he serviced the lawnmower before he sustained his injuries. Do these interrogatories seek relevant information?
- Which of the following would be considered “documents” that could be requested under a request for production of documents?
- Woodson sues GreenChem company for property damage sustained from a large explosion at a local GreenChem facility. GreenChem’s attorney investigates the site of the explosion and writes down his personal impressions on a notepad. Woodson sends a request for production of documents to GreenChem seeking a copy of the attorney’s notes. GreenChem objects based on the work product doctrine in Rule 26(b)(3). Is the objection valid?
- You represent Granny Smith who is suing Speedy Sam for injuries sustained in a car accident at an intersection. Granny alleges that Speedy was at fault because he ran a red light. There were several witnesses to the accident. Which is the best way to find out whether Speedy ran the light?
GOVT 407 Quiz Final Effect of Judgments
- After the judgment for Allston in Rizzuto’s case, Boyer tells Rizzuto that he was also injured using the same type of Allston glove and recovered judgment against Allston on a strict liability theory, which did not require proof that Allston was negligent. Rizzuto files a new action against Allston based on the original accident but asserting a right to recover only on the basis of strict liability. Will the claim be barred?
- Assume same facts in question 9. Does collateral estoppel bar relitigation of any issue decided in the first suit?
- Assume that in the original suit described in this example Vanderbilt moved for judgment as a matter of law on Fisk’s mutual mistake defense, and the court granted the motion, finding, as a matter of law, that there was no mutual mistake. The case went to the jury on the defense that AB coal was adequate under the contract, and the jury rendered a verdict for Fisk. Subsequently, Vanderbilt sues Fisk for the 2010 breach. Fisk raises the same defenses. May Fisk estop Vanderbilt from claiming that AB coal does not meet the contract specifications?
- Assume that in Vanderbilt’s second action Fisk defends on the ground that AB coal satisfies the contract specifications. He offers expert testimony, not offered in the original action, that AB coal is universally accepted in the industry as “first quality” coal. Will the court bar him from relitigating the issue?
- Assume that Rizzuto won his first suit against Allston and recovered $3,000 in compensatory damages. Boyer subsequently tells him that he had claimed gross negligence by Allston in a prior suit based on the same defective glove and recovered punitive damages. Rizzuto brings a second action against Allston for punitive damages based on gross negligence. Can Allston successfully plead res judicata?
- Assume that Rizzuto’s contract calls for royalties (or “residuals” in the language of the trade) to be paid to Rizzuto for each year that the commercials are used. Allston pays the residuals in the first year at 5 percent, while Rizzuto claims it should be 10 percent. Rizzuto sues and wins. At the end of the next year, Allston pays Rizzuto again at the 5 percent rate. Rizzuto sues again, for the second year’s residuals. Allston pleads res judicata. Is the second action barred?
- Assume that Rizzuto recovered $15,000 in an action against Allston, but Allston was in shaky financial condition and never paid. Rizzuto later brings a new action against Allston after learning that its financial condition has improved. Does res judicata bar the second suit?
- Assume that Rizzuto presented evidence in the original action against Allston that he suffered impaired vision in his eye for several weeks as a result of the accident, missed two weeks of the baseball season, and had some pain from the injury. This is the only evidence he presented on damages. The jury finds for Rizzuto and awards him $10,000 damages. Three years later, after the judgment has been entered and paid, Rizzuto develops migraine headaches. His doctor tells him that these often result from an eye injury and are likely to continue indefinitely. Can Rizzuto sue Allston for damages for these headaches?
- Assume that Vanderbilt claims in the first suit that Fisk delivered Grade AB coal from March to August of 2008, which did not comply with the contract specification for “first quality” coal. Fisk admits that he delivered Grade AB coal during that period but defends on the ground that AB coal satisfies the contract specification. The case is tried to a jury, which finds for Vanderbilt and awards him damages. Vanderbilt sues Fisk again for delivering Grade AB coal from February to June 2010. Will collateral estoppel apply to any issue?
- Assume that Vanderbilt’s second suit against Fisk is for delivering Grade AB coal from September to December 2012. Fisk defends on the ground that Vanderbilt had agreed to an oral modification of the contract allowing delivery of Grade AB coal due to a national shortage of “first quality” coal during those months. Will collateral estoppel bar Fisk from relying on this defense?
- At the time Rizzuto was injured using Allston’s glove, he had an endorsement contract with them to promote the glove in television commercials. He had made the ads but had not been paid by Allston. Acting on the advice of his lawyers that asserting the contract claim in the negligence suit would confuse matters, Rizzuto did not assert his contract claim in the negligence suit against Allston. Instead, he sues separately on the contract claim after judgment in the negligence action. Allston pleads res judicata. Was the lawyers’ advice sound?
- Imagine that Rizzuto’s vicious grounder breaks through his glove, whacks him in the eye, and bounces off Kubek, injuring him as well. Kubek sues Allston and recovers. Rizzuto testifies in Kubek’s suit. Rizzuto now takes the cue and brings an action to recover for his injuries in the same accident. Allston pleads the inevitable res judicata. Is the suit barred?
- On the preceding facts, may Vanderbilt bar Fisk from relitigating the mutual mistake defense?
- Rizzuto’s eye is injured when his baseball glove breaks while he is fielding a vicious grounder. He sues Allston Leather Company for negligent manufacture of the glove. The case is tried and judgment is entered for Allston. Later, Rizzuto sues again. He argues that the judge in the first suit erroneously excluded important evidence from Rizzuto’s expert on baseball glove manufacturing standards and that he should have a chance to have a trial with all the admissible evidence properly before the jury. Allston pleads res judicata. Will the defense bar Rizzuto’s second action?
- Vanderbilt enters into a contract with Fisk for the delivery of 50 tons of coal per week to Vanderbilt’s power plant, for the period from January 2008 to December 2012. In 2009, Vanderbilt sues Fisk for breach of contract. He claims that the coal delivered from March to August 2008 was “Grade AB” rather than “first quality” coal, as required by the contract. Fisk denies the allegation that he delivered Grade AB coal instead of first quality coal and prevails in a jury trial. Subsequently, Vanderbilt sues Fisk again for breach of contract on the ground that the coal delivered between February and June 2010 was Grade AB. Fisk again denies that he delivered AB coal. Explain why Vanderbilt’s second suit is not barred by claim preclusion/res judicata? Vanderbilt is not seeking to relitigate his original claim for the breach of contract that took place in 2008. Rather, he is litigating a new claim for a later breach of the same contract.)
- Vanderbilt sues Fisk for breach of the coal delivery contract, claiming that Fisk delivered AB coal from March to August 2008. Fisk defends on the ground that the contract was invalid due to mutual mistake and, in the alternative, that AB coal complies with the contract specifications. The jury renders a general verdict for Fisk. Later, Vanderbilt sues Fisk for a subsequent breach of the contract by delivering AB coal from February to June 2010. Fisk again defends on the ground that AB coal satisfies the contract specifications. Does collateral estoppel bar relitigation of this issue?