GOVT 407 Quiz Effect of Judgments

GOVT 407 Quiz Effect of Judgments

GOVT 407 Quiz Effect of Judgments

1. After the judgment for Allston in Rizzuto’s case, Boyer tells Rizzuto that he was also injured using the same type of Allston glove and recovered judgment against Allston on a strict liability theory, which did not require proof that Allston was negligent. Rizzuto files a new action against Allston based on the original accident but asserting a right to recover only on the basis of strict liability. Will the claim be barred?
2. Assume same facts in question 9. Does collateral estoppel bar relitigation of any issue decided in the first suit?
3. Assume that in the original suit described in this example Vanderbilt moved for judgment as a matter of law on Fisk’s mutual mistake defense, and the court granted the motion, finding, as a matter of law, that there was no mutual mistake. The case went to the jury on the defense that AB coal was adequate under the contract, and the jury rendered a verdict for Fisk. Subsequently, Vanderbilt sues Fisk for the 2010 breach. Fisk raises the same defenses. May Fisk estop Vanderbilt from claiming that AB coal does not meet the contract specifications?
4. Assume that in Vanderbilt’s second action Fisk defends on the ground that AB coal satisfies the contract specifications. He offers expert testimony, not offered in the original action, that AB coal is universally accepted in the industry as “first quality” coal. Will the court bar him from relitigating the issue?
5. Assume that Rizzuto won his first suit against Allston and recovered $3,000 in compensatory damages. Boyer subsequently tells him that he had claimed gross negligence by Allston in a prior suit based on the same defective glove and recovered punitive damages. Rizzuto brings a second action against Allston for punitive damages based on gross negligence. Can Allston successfully plead res judicata?
6. Assume that Rizzuto’s contract calls for royalties (or “residuals” in the language of the trade) to be paid to Rizzuto for each year that the commercials are used. Allston pays the residuals in the first year at 5 percent, while Rizzuto claims it should be 10 percent. Rizzuto sues and wins. At the end of the next year, Allston pays Rizzuto again at the 5 percent rate. Rizzuto sues again, for the second year’s residuals. Allston pleads res judicata. Is the second action barred?
7. Assume that Rizzuto recovered $15,000 in an action against Allston, but Allston was in shaky financial condition and never paid. Rizzuto later brings a new action against Allston after learning that its financial condition has improved. Does res judicata bar the second suit?
8. Assume that Rizzuto presented evidence in the original action against Allston that he suffered impaired vision in his eye for several weeks as a result of the accident, missed two weeks of the baseball season, and had some pain from the injury. This is the only evidence he presented on damages. The jury finds for Rizzuto and awards him $10,000 damages. Three years later, after the judgment has been entered and paid, Rizzuto develops migraine headaches. His doctor tells him that these often result from an eye injury and are likely to continue indefinitely. Can Rizzuto sue Allston for damages for these headaches?
9. Assume that Vanderbilt claims in the first suit that Fisk delivered Grade AB coal from March to August of 2008, which did not comply with the contract specification for “first quality” coal. Fisk admits that he delivered Grade AB coal during that period but defends on the ground that AB coal satisfies the contract specification. The case is tried to a jury, which finds for Vanderbilt and awards him damages. Vanderbilt sues Fisk again for delivering Grade AB coal from February to June 2010. Will collateral estoppel apply to any issue?
10. Assume that Vanderbilt’s second suit against Fisk is for delivering Grade AB coal from September to December 2012. Fisk defends on the ground that Vanderbilt had agreed to an oral modification of the contract allowing delivery of Grade AB coal due to a national shortage of “first quality” coal during those months. Will collateral estoppel bar Fisk from relying on this defense?
11. At the time Rizzuto was injured using Allston’s glove, he had an endorsement contract with them to promote the glove in television commercials. He had made the ads but had not been paid by Allston. Acting on the advice of his lawyers that asserting the contract claim in the negligence suit would confuse matters, Rizzuto did not assert his contract claim in the negligence suit against Allston. Instead, he sues separately on the contract claim after judgment in the negligence action. Allston pleads res judicata. Was the lawyers’ advice sound?
12. Imagine that Rizzuto’s vicious grounder breaks through his glove, whacks him in the eye, and bounces off Kubek, injuring him as well. Kubek sues Allston and recovers. Rizzuto testifies in Kubek’s suit. Rizzuto now takes the cue and brings an action to recover for his injuries in the same accident. Allston pleads the inevitable res judicata. Is the suit barred?
13. On the preceding facts, may Vanderbilt bar Fisk from relitigating the mutual mistake defense?
14. Rizzuto’s eye is injured when his baseball glove breaks while he is fielding a vicious grounder. He sues Allston Leather Company for negligent manufacture of the glove. The case is tried and judgment is entered for Allston. Later, Rizzuto sues again. He argues that the judge in the first suit erroneously excluded important evidence from Rizzuto’s expert on baseball glove manufacturing standards and that he should have a chance to have a trial with all the admissible evidence properly before the jury. Allston pleads res judicata. Will the defense bar Rizzuto’s second action?
15. Vanderbilt enters into a contract with Fisk for the delivery of 50 tons of coal per week to Vanderbilt’s power plant, for the period from January 2008 to December 2012. In 2009, Vanderbilt sues Fisk for breach of contract. He claims that the coal delivered from March to August 2008 was “Grade AB” rather than “first quality” coal, as required by the contract. Fisk denies the allegation that he delivered Grade AB coal instead of first quality coal and prevails in a jury trial. Subsequently, Vanderbilt sues Fisk again for breach of contract on the ground that the coal delivered between February and June 2010 was Grade AB. Fisk again denies that he delivered AB coal. Explain why Vanderbilt’s second suit is not barred by claim preclusion/res judicata? ([Extra credit question worth 5 points] Vanderbilt is not seeking to relitigate his original claim for the breach of contract that took place in 2008. Rather, he is litigating a new claim for a later breach of the same contract.)
16. Vanderbilt sues Fisk for breach of the coal delivery contract, claiming that Fisk delivered AB coal from March to August 2008. Fisk defends on the ground that the contract was invalid due to mutual mistake and, in the alternative, that AB coal complies with the contract specifications. The jury renders a general verdict for Fisk. Later, Vanderbilt sues Fisk for a subsequent breach of the contract by delivering AB coal from February to June 2010. Fisk again defends on the ground that AB coal satisfies the contract specifications. Does collateral estoppel bar relitigation of this issue?